CALIFORNIA DEVELOPS THE RYAN REFORMS 1966-1970

Sidney A. Inglis

Editor's Introduction:

Leo J. Ryan, the driving force behind the Ryan Act of 1970, was an informed and astute politician. He worked hard to educate himself and his legislative colleagues on innovative and imaginative educational thinking of the late 1960s. He knew when to concede without compromising his principles. He understood how to coalesce the national drive for greater professionalization of teaching, the local press for a supply of qualified teachers who could be flexibly assigned, and the political pressures of special interest groups and party politics. Inglis holds both an "outsider's" and an "insider's" view: he is an historian and, as a former staff consultant for the Commission for Teacher Preparation and Licensing, he was responsible for interpreting the Ryan act to others.

Prior to Leo J. Ryan's election to the state legislature, he was in a city council member and mayor of South San Francisco and had been an educator Nebraska before moving to California—and that fact had much to do with the eventual establishment of the Ryan Act. In Nebraska, Ryan taught English and social science and later he served as superintendent of a small Nebraska high school district. Shortly after World War II, he moved to California and was hired to teach civics in a school district near San Francisco. His teaching career was stopped, however, when his application for a California credential was denied because he lacked a minor professional education requirement. Irked as he was, he made up the credential requirement, sustaining a loss of income until it was completed. Later, Ryan told this tale often as a kind of exemplar of bureaucracy

and red tape (Inglis, 1974a, 6-7). As an apparent consequence, the story has long been told, he developed a continuing hatred of educational bureaucracies. His intensive actions between 1965 and 1970 seem to lend credence to this tale.

While Ryan showed antipathy for the state's educational bureaucracy, he consistently showed support of teachers and the profession of teaching and built a reputation for independence from special interests and a strong desire to reform teacher education and credentialing, especially in light of teachers' problems in obtaining Fisher Act credentials.

> *"There has been much comment recently," said Ryan, "about the alleged teacher shortage. Many educators have complained that because California has raised its standards so high, that migration of teachers into California from other states will be discouraged. If this is true, the Legislature must make some adjustments in the Fisher Act" ([Footnote 73 from Chapter 4]).*

Indeed, Ryan's early legislative proposals in education were often aimed at increasing the autonomy and compensation of competent teachers. One example is his successful stewardship of AB 451 in 1968, described in this undated press release from Ryan's office:

> *Teachers will no longer be tried by a "kangaroo court." They will be insured a fair and formal hearing.*
>
> *AB 451, authored by Assemblyman Leo J. Ryan, of South San Francisco, guarantees teachers due process on all complaints brought against them before the State Department of Education's Committee on Credentials. The bill was signed into law by Governor Ronald Reagan on Saturday, September 2…*

A recognized expert on education, Assemblyman Ryan said, "Three years of work by subcommittee on education went into this bill." "In the past, an accused teacher was not notified of a hearing, often not admitted to the hearing, or even informed the charges against him," Ryan said. "While we are spending billions for school buildings, we were neglecting the individual who taught our children and who was working in a climate of fear similar to that caused by Communist purges."

Under Ryan's leadership, the newly-established Subcommittee conducted public hearings during 1965 and 1966, inviting a great deal of testimony from educators in the field. Its report, *The Restoration of Teaching*, issued in January, 1967, was critical of the State Department of Education and, by implication, of the State Superintendent of Public Instruction, Max Rafferty. The Subcommittee found all major education organizations supported the basic provisions of the Fisher Act but were confused by the inept implementation of that law.

On the basis of the testimony, we have found that if there is a problem of educating future teachers, the fault lies not with the law, but with those who are responsible for this task on a day-to-day basis. We found, for example, that is it difficult for an individual teacher to get reliable information from the credentials office of the State Department of Education. The departmental officials explained that there was a staff shortage and that the Department of Finance had urged minimum efforts, but we are inclined to think that it is unnecessary administrative complexity that causes much of the problem.

Seldom in the history of California has a public mandate [the Fisher Act] of such proportion, heavily supported by both parties, been subjected to so much bureaucratic frustration. We think it incumbent on the State Department of Education and the persons responsible for teacher

> *education to accept public demand and do their duty (Restoration, 1967, 12-13).*

The Subcommittee also criticized the practice at some colleges and universities of forcing elementary credential candidates to wait until their fifth year before allowing them to take student teaching, in direct conflict with the Fisher Act's purpose:

> *It was clearly the intent of the Legislature that elementary teachers should be allowed to begin teaching after four years of college training. Yet several Schools of Education have renumbered the course in practice teaching so that it falls in the graduate year administratively, and thus the teacher is forced to remain in college for the fifth straight year, legislative intent notwithstanding (Restoration, 1967, 12-13).*

The report contained two surprising recommendations, considering the direction of Ryan's future actions. First: "our basic recommendation, therefore, is that the 1967 Legislature make no substantial changes in the [Fisher Act]" (*Restoration,* 1967, 14). The second recommendation arose from an analysis of testimony by individuals relating "horror stories" about multitudinous college requirements for "academic" majors:

> *The State Board of Education could be directed to recognize various departments within colleges and universities as suitable for the designation of "academic." We think such simplification has much to recommend it, and, if simplicity is achieved, we think it well to authorize each recognized college or university in California to issue state teaching and administrative credentials in the name of the State Department of Education, subject to random post audits by the Department (Restoration, 1967, 15).*

The Subcommittee's rationale for this last, rather startling, recommendation was that it might reduce the Department's work load and long delays in credential issuances, so that

"the Department then would be giving most of its attention to out-of-state applicants"—a and also to affect budget reductions.

The Subcommittee's report made it clear, however, that there should be no reduction in the academic standards of preparation that the Fisher Act had established. To bolster its position—ironic in light of later disagreements—the report cites passages from Rafferty's book, Suffer Little Children, bitingly critical of the lack of academic preparation for teachers and administrators prior to the Fisher Act.

> *We think Dr. Rafferty, as well as others we might have quoted, has admirably expressed the fundamental concept inherent in California's 1961 credential law. For all practical purposes, these beliefs expressed in Suffer Little Children in 1962 were enacted by the 1961 Legislature because of general public demand and the specific recommendations of the Citizens Advisory Committee (Restoration, 1967, 16).*

The Restoration of Teaching did not confine its scope to preparation and credentialing matters alone but also studied teacher supply and demand, the operations of the Committee of Credentials—the body that suspended and revoked educational credentials—making recommendations about all of these. It boldly included a section titled "A Study of Methods of Upgrading and Improving the Teaching Profession," a range of findings and recommendations concerning the working conditions of teachers, salaries, and reasons for many talented individuals leaving the profession. The report, then, was a comprehensive and meant-to-be important status summary of a vital political area in California. It served to expand the political base and body of expertise that Ryan was building as he sought to gain greater prominence and influence within the Legislature.

The Search for a Cohesive Platform of Reform

An immediate legislative outcome of the Subcommittee's report was Assembly Concurrent Resolution 123, in which Ryan urged the State Board to declare a one-year moratorium on changes in credential regulations and requirements, a politically logical response to the hue and cry that he and his colleagues had heard so frequently. However, such legislative resolutions often are more smoke than fire, for they have no effect in law; they generally serve as a trumpet call directed to the public for publicity purposes. In this case, there is little evidence that the State Board paid any heed to ACR 123, even if it had been administratively possible to do so.

A second outcome of the Assembly Subcommittee's work, and a far more substantial event, was the establishment in 1967 of a legislative committee that spanned both houses, the Joint Committee on Teacher Credentialing Practices. This Joint Committee consisted of three members of each house who were seasoned legislators—Assembly Members James Dent and Victor Veysey, as well as Ryan, and Senators Mervyn Dymally, John Harmer and Albert Rodda. Ryan was named chair.

At the same time, an important new structure became a part of the Legislature's operation, one that immensely increased the power and expertise of legislative committee chairs and the Legislature as a total policy-making body: the introduction of full-time staff members to serve as "consultants" to major committees. This innovation was a part of Assembly Speaker Jesse Unruh's grand vision for an effective state legislature. For a time after Unruh established such major structural enhancements to the operative capacities of the California Legislature, it became a highly-touted model for the nation. The establishment of legislative committee consultants provided legislative leaders and committee members far more outreach than they previously held. Committee staff were not as tied to constituent concerns and demands; they could use multiple resources to acquire information about major issues under study—condensing and compiling it for quick study by legislators, who genuinely had little time themselves to conduct major policy research projects, even on a temporary basis. Such as the case with Ryan's new Joint Committee on Teacher Credentialing Practices.

The Committee chose Denis Doyle as its consultant, a non-educator who would come to have an enormous influence on California's teachers because of his personal drive, Ryan's affinity for his views, the broad net of information search he cast, and the extensive and intensive negotiations with legislators, special interests and the general public that he carried out from 1967 through 1970.[1] He has often, if informally, been credited with being the major force and thinker behind the reforms embodied in AB 740 (1969) and AB 122 (1970), the two "Ryan" Acts, while Ryan was the out-front and legitimate driver of the political action necessary for such achievement.

The Joint Committee began work in earnest in early 1968, with two major public hearings. At the first of these hearings, April 8-9, at San Francisco State College, Ryan outlined the Committee's purpose:

> *The issue before this committee is quite simply the quality of California education. Teacher certification is the state's checkpoint or quality control device to insure that adequately prepared teachers are in the classroom. The state's role in this process is necessarily limited and to a certain extent ambivalent, for no qualitative process can assure beyond a doubt quality instruction. As we all know, in the final analysis teaching is an art. It is a changing, fluid, often provisional and tentative relationship between teacher and student. It demands of the mind sensitivity and intuition which cannot be mandated by the state.*
>
> *We of this committee recognize this. However, this does not relieve us of our obligation to establish standards, and there are minimum standards which are appropriate. The development of basic instructional skills, particularly in reading and arithmetic, and the insistence that teachers be knowledgeable in the subject matter area are only the most obvious.*

[1] Two other consultants were also to play large parts in the direction and progress of the Ryan Acts: James Murdoch, a legislative analyst who gave highly important testimony in 1967 to the Ryan Committee and who later became the consultant to the Assembly Education Committee; and Leroy Lowery, a former educator who served as consultant to the Senate Education Committee during these crucial years and who played a pivotal role in the final enactment and signing of AB 122 in 1970.

I would also mention that while the basic purpose of this committee is policy review and formulation, financial and procedural problems have now reached the point where they must be reviewed. The fact is, proliferation of rules and regulations have, and will continue to have, significant financial and procedural implications for this state.

Does, for instance, unit by unit review of transcripts produce better qualified teachers? And what is the appropriate role of the recommending process? The backlog of teacher credential applications is now reaching crisis proportions as will be indicated in our testimony.

Finally, I should like to say that the committee's only preconception is that the system is not working as well as it should, and we hope to improve, strengthen and simplify it in the interest of improved education in California. And, I might add that we don't intend to relax the attempt which the Fisher Bill made to impose some kind of quality on the instruction and training of teachers before they get into the classroom. We are trying to improve and not reduce quality (Joint Committee, April, 1968, 1-3).

At the same time the Joint Committee was organizing its work, the legislature had asked the Legislative Analyst's Office to study the rapidly increasing credential application fees–in 1967 the State Board increased the fee from $15 to $20—and report back. The Analyst's Office final report, titled simply *Teacher Credentialing*, issued in February, 1968, was clearly critical of the State Department's credential issuing process. It documents inefficiencies in the Department's licensing processes, noting that from 1963 to 1967, the increase in expenditures by the credentialing office was significantly greater than the increase in the number of credential applications received. At the same time, processing time for an application had grown to over three months. Because the licensing office relied on manual filing, these antiquated procedures that served to clog the system and rendered it unable to provide the legislature (or anyone else) with

summary data on hundreds of thousands of individuals holding California credentials of all kinds. The report presented a set of recommendations dealing with administrative and fiscal matters designed to streamline the credential process. One recommendation, however, introduced an examination system, a concept that was far more than a procedural matter: "By November, 1968, the State Board of Education should submit to the legislature a report on credential regulations . . . including the substitution of a statewide *examination* for teacher applicants for all or part of the present requirements" (*Teacher,* 1968, 33 [emphasis added]). This report came at a propitious time for Ryan and the Joint Committee.

The report's principal's author was James Murdoch, who became the first witness before the Joint Committee at its initial public hearing on April 8. Basing most of his testimony on *Teacher Credentialing*, Murdoch focused particularly upon the significantly higher costs of individual credentials compared to the relatively low increase in the volume of credential applications, testifying that since 1963, the cost had increased 73%, while the number of credentials issued had increased by only 14%, and that it took up to four months to process a credential application. At the same time, he found that the credentials office had expanded to over 50 credential analysts, with a large support staff. Each credential applicant's record—transcripts and other papers—required a detailed, often subjective, analysis to determine whether the individual's college units in subject matter, professional education and student teaching met the requirements of the multitudinous and confusing regulations that had evolved since 1963. He stated that it was not the Fisher Bill *per se* that was to blame but the specific and complex regulations adopted by the State Board in its implementation of the Fisher Act (Joint Committee April 1968, 21-34). He predicted that if the credentialing system continued in its present state, it would collapse within two years. He acknowledged, however, that the Legislative Analyst's Office was working to provide computers and a consultant to the credentialing office in order to improve the process, indicating that this step would have at least three favorable outcomes: (a) the speed of credential issuances would increase; (b) the growth of credentialing staff would slow or stop; and (c) it would make available badly-needed summary data to policy makers about teacher demographics, supply, and

demand information and the like. In reply to Doyle's query about whether the system just described could be expanded to include processing data on teacher examinations, Murdoch agreed, adding that full support could be expanded almost infinitely. Indeed, he argued for a general examination system for teachers, a policy that, Rafferty had for many years urged the State Board to consider. But the Board had never shown support for examinations as a general requirement (Lane, 1964, 133).

The issue of teacher examinations, introduced by Murdoch report and the Doyle query, was to become a major plank in the reform platform that Doyle and Ryan were beginning sketchily to formulate. The exploration of examinations as a sanctioned basis for credentialing teachers and other educational specialties was to gain greater credence and momentum as the year 1968 progressed. Yet, as radical an idea as it may have seemed to some in the middle of twentieth century California, it had an earlier ancestor in the teacher exams of the 1860s.[2]

Following Murdoch's testimony, Carl Larson, the Chief of the Bureau of Credentials, found himself in a tight spot, for he was in charge of the office under attack; was a subordinate of Max Rafferty, who was at odds with the Board; and was also representing the State Board at this hearing. Larson stepped into the breach by placing the source of the widespread dissatisfaction with credentialing in the Board's complex regulations and in the disputes between the Board and Superintendent Rafferty. The Board had attempted to accommodate "requests from the field" and, rather than grant individual exceptions, had too often changed the regulations. Its policy-making efforts were plagued by problems with the academic/non-academic distinction (Joint Committee April, 1968, 21-34).

---

[2] In the mid-1850s members of the Legislature and the State Superintendent of Public Instruction became acutely concerned about the preparation of individuals teaching in the schools at that time, with the Superintendent reporting in 1869 that only one-third of California's public school teachers "were fit to teach." He agitated for a more systematic and centralized system (meaning state control) of teacher preparation. In 1860 a State Board of Examiners was established by law, composed of the State Superintendent and three county superintendents. This body had an added power -- that any certificate it issued would be valid in all counties of the state, rather than only for the county of issuance, the previous practice. In 1863 the State Board of Examiners received additional powers, allowing it to grant specific grades of elementary certificates. The law further prescribed that "said certificates shall be issued to such persons only as shall have passed a satisfactory examination in the studies pursued in the different grades ... and shall give evidence of good moral character, and of ability and fitness to teach ... in any school district in the State, without further examination (Delevan 1965, 34-35).

An extremely important suggestion was made by Joseph Brooks, Executive Director of the California School Boards Association (CSBA), who proposed that a commission be established that would develop teacher education policies, standards, and implementation rules. The ultimate asset of such a body was that it could adapt more readily to the constantly changing needs of society and would not be rigidly locked into laws, while allowing many groups to participate in the policy making process.

Viewing it as a "professional commission," he elaborated on its composition, its reporting authority, and suggested that it could be more effective and efficient in carrying out its assigned role than other state agencies now doing the job.[3]

At this early stage, the idea of an independent credentialing commission did not catch on with members of the Committee as a whole. Later, a quite similar concept was suggested by James Koerner, a critic of education, with whom Ryan and Doyle began communicating, and both men later came to view the concept far more favorably than when it was first heard before their Committee. Therefore, while Brooks did not originate the idea, the timing of the suggestion, in conjunction with other important happenings, was ultimately to have a major effect on Ryan's thinking.

The second hearing of the Committee was held in May 1968, in San Diego and was essentially a repeat of the first hearing—with one important exception. Gjertud Smith, Principal of Chatsworth High School, testified about the difficulty of finding high school teachers who were prepared to teach reading to their students—in addition to their regular subject. She told the Committee that she felt many students came to high school who had "never learned to read" (Joint Committee May, 1968, 23-27). She pointed out that students who had poor reading skills would have a great deal of difficulty reading

[3] The notion of an independent commission to be responsible for so vital an area of public policy was not entirely new, of course -- either in California (CTA had long held such a desire) or elsewhere in the nation -- but it never had been seriously considered by lawmakers. Lowery, the Senate Education consultant who was attending the meeting to keep up with what was being said, challenged this suggestion as a device to delegate teacher preparation to the education establishment. He saw it giving unrestricted authority to teacher education institutions through an approved programs approach, where approval would be determined by the very professionals who had shown no desire for real reform.

textbooks and other instructional materials in whatever subject they were studying—history, science, mathematics, or even manuals used in their shop classes. She believed all teachers should have some knowledge of and skills in teaching reading. Smith's was a unique recommendation, one that had never been suggested as a requirement for all teachers. Apparently Ryan—or Doyle—was struck by its common sense, for such a requirement was later to appear in Ryan's credentialing law.

There is no evidence that at the outset Ryan, other committee members, or staff had a completely clear idea of exactly what they wanted in a thorough revision of existing credentialing practices; they believed that some kind of major change was needed because of the numerous and intense problems that had arisen. The two mid-1968 hearings were exploratory, designed to gather information and ideas upon which to craft some kind of new legislation. Most testimony was in the form of unrelated complaints, suggestions, and outright requests which did little to give the Committee members a concerted sense of direction and substance. However, two suggestions—for an independent commission and a requirement in the teaching of reading—were to survive and to have a profound effect upon the content of the eventual law.

It is also significant that in the mass of special interest testimony, and in contrast to the central theme of the hearings leading to the Fisher Act seven years earlier, no one recommended seriously that stronger academic emphasis be required in the preparation of teachers and administrators. Rather, most witnesses argued that unwarranted academic stress had created teacher shortages and other problems—notably the intractable gridlock caused by the academic/non-academic distinction definitions that had become the Achilles heel of the Fisher Act's implementation. Quite possibly those strong-minded academicians who had fought so hard in the early 1960s for academic rigor in the preparation and practice of teachers did not appear to testify at these hearings for a number of potent reasons, not the least being that during the mid-to-late 1960s the nation was convulsed by college student riots and rebellions that brought into serious question long-held concepts of academic, political, and social authority in American society. At any rate, the bulk of testimony centered on credential policy and process problems and on the lack of equity between the status of "first class" teachers, who had sanctioned

academic majors, and "second class" teachers, who had credentials authorizing teaching "applied subjects" like home economics, industrial arts, and physical education. Over the next two years these groups would return time and again to plead their needs while credential reform legislation was slowly being shaped into a new law. Some were more or less successful in getting Ryan to include some or all of their requests; most were not.

The hearings, then, were instructive, even valuable in some ways as a part of the exploratory process for Ryan and Doyle. The two searchers then turned to enlarging the geographic and ideological bases for their thinking.

Turning to the National Arena for Ideas

Doyle began communicating with educational leaders across the country in seeking to identify people with original and important ideas about teacher education reform. Ryan also sought names of experts and instances of exemplary programs. In the course of this outreach, he talked with State Board Member Margaret Bates, who had been one of the State Board's driving forces behind the Fisher Act's thrust, and who recommended contact with James D. Koerner of Massachusetts. This lead was to have immense significance for Ryan and Doyle.

Koerner had been at the forefront of the academic revolution, especially in the Northeast. A former professor at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, he was a charter member of the Council for Basic Education (CBE) and its executive director for two years. He had written a searing indictment of schools of education, *The Miseducation of Teachers* (1963), basing his criticisms on a study of teacher training conducted in the early 1960s.

> *From the beginning of my survey of teacher education, I made a special effort to visit all classes at all levels and to discuss them with education*

> *students. I managed to visit 200 classes, chiefly in education, but also in academic subjects that most often are a part of teachers' programs. Let me say at once that I do not see how any observer, having made such visits to a large number of institutions, could fail to conclude that education courses fully deserve their ill repute. Like the textbooks, they suffer from a high degree of dullness and superfluity (Koerner, 1963, 82).*

Soon after Bates's recommendation, Ryan sent Koerner a copy of *The Restoration of Teaching*. Koerner sent Ryan a copy of a recent study of Massachusetts teacher preparation policies and practices. The communication between Koerner and Ryan and his consultant increased in tempo and substance, with Ryan actively seeking more leads to places he should visit and people to whom he and Doyle should speak. As a part of this activity, a meeting was arranged in the Summer of 1968, between the Joint Committee and the Massachusetts Senate Majority Leader, so that the Committee could learn first hand the Massachusetts legislative proposals.

The Massachusetts legislative proposals came from the Massachusetts Advisory Council on Education, a body created in February, 1968, to help draft a design for comprehensive state reform of teacher education. As a high-profile critic of current practices in teacher education, Koerner was invited to appear before the Council in February, 1968, to present his trenchant ideas on improving teacher education. In one of his most important, and perhaps most radical, suggestions, Koerner urged the creation of "some new instrumentality of control" for teacher licensing, perhaps some kind of licensing board. He despaired that real change in teacher education would ever occur from within the ranks of professional educators: "It is clear that the teacher training industry welcomes change if it makes no waves, rocks no boats, usurps no power, unseats no sovereigns, undermines no empires, threatens no financial or professional interests" (Lane, 1979, 166-167). He described in detail the structure that he envisioned: it was to be a process that would be open to far broader representation from the wide range of groups and interests which were part to the overall preparation and licensing of educators, definitely to include classroom teachers, as well as the general public, faculty members from

university departments of academic subjects, and other key interests—all except representatives of the "teacher education industry." In order to achieve this broadly representative and open process, and to escape traditional models of state educational control, Koerner proposed the establishment of an independent state-sanctioned body, a licensing board, that would be responsible for developing and carrying out good policy in this important area of public policy and concern. In recommending that the licensing board establish and gain advice from numerous specific topic-related advisory panels whenever the need arose for current and relevant input, he envisioned an even broader social and political base for identifying and compiling sound knowledge and promising practices in teacher education (Lane, 1979, 168). Koerner rejected the "approved programs" approach suggested by some thinkers—James Conant for one, and the State Board, for another (Brodt, 1989, 196)—reiterating his distrust of professional educators and the educational bureaucracy.

While his attack upon the traditional model of state control of teacher education and credentialing and the envisioning of a new, independent, and broadly-based state agency may have been his most profound and important recommendation, Koerner had additional thoughts about how teacher education should be improved. For one, he saw no reason for a fifth year of study to be required to teach, believing that a qualified person should begin teaching after receiving a Baccalaureate Degree. He also feared that by requiring an additional year beyond the traditional four-year program, institutions of higher education would add on requirements in education, further burdening candidates with financial costs and unnecessary, if not stultifying, pedagogy. Part of this thinking was that "education" should be eliminated as an undergraduate major and that admission standards for teacher preparation programs be raised. He felt that all teachers should be required to pass an essay qualifying examination. Indeed, in *The Miseducation of Teachers,* he argued clearly and strongly that examinations should be an integral part of the process for determining a teacher candidates' qualification to teach. While conceding that a mere set of pencil-and paper tests alone, including the National Teacher

Examinations, would be quite inadequate for such purposes, he nevertheless stated that he believed that a rational and sound system could be developed:

> *Despite the negative attitude of the education field, it is safe to say that the overwhelming majority of academicians and their professional associations would see far more virtue than vice in a carefully developed system of qualifying examinations for teachers, and would feel that the exams should be prepared by recognized men in the fields being tested, in collaboration with high school teachers and perhaps other parties. They would also feel, in all probability, that essay-demonstration exams, although expensive to administer, are still the only way to test a person's grasp of most academic disciplines, his ability to reason logically in the field, to organize, relate, synthesize, and give orderly expression to his thoughts (Koerner, 1963, 256).*

Koerner did not recommend total abolition of professional education as part of the preparation of teachers, but he felt that such requirements should be limited to 18 semester-units for secondary teachers and 24 units for elementary teachers. While he was not about to offer a guarantee that his plan would definitely lead to improved teacher education policies and practices, Koerner felt that it was more likely to bring about significant reform than any other way, certainly more likely than waiting for it to happen with existing structures.

In his study, Ken Lane provides an incisive analysis of the similarities between the licensing body envisioned by Koerner and that long-envisioned by the CTA:

> *There is an obvious resemblance between Koerner's Education Licensing board and the CTA's long-sought recommendations for a professional licensure board [in California]. The conceptual origins and the goals of the two proposals, however, were quite different. CTA leaders and other professional educators would have the licensing board dominated by*

> *professionals; such control of occupational entry was, after all, itself a hallmark of a profession—especially of the medical profession. Koerner, on the other hand, in seeking to reform teacher education in Massachusetts, would tilt the membership in favor of university scholars, distinguished laymen, and outstanding classroom teachers. Teacher educators and other educationists, in Koerner's view, should be excluded at all cost because they, more than any other group, were responsible for deficiencies in American public education (Lane, 1979, 168-169).*

Even as the Massachusetts proposal to establish such an independent body was headed for defeat, due to intense power and ideological clashes (Lane 1979, 170-171), Ryan obtained that state's Advisory Council's report, and he and Doyle studied it for ideas and direction. In the Council's final report to the Massachusetts Legislature, they found most of Koerner's plan for an independent licensing body, although the Council recommended a somewhat different composition for the agency from Koerner's recommendation. Specifically, the report recommended a licensing board that would be made of six classroom teachers, two non-teaching personnel, five college/university professors, and only two lay persons. *Ex officio* members would represent major professional organizations, the State Board of Education, and the Massachusetts Legislature. The report also recommended other significant changes in teacher education. Lane concludes that "the Massachusetts effort was therefore almost a replay of similar reform efforts in California in the early 1960s when the Fisher Act was born. But, on the East Coast the reform effort was in vain: the proposals died in the Massachusetts Legislature" (Lane, 1979, 170).

Quite significantly, many of Koerner's major, and perhaps "radical," recommendations—while failing in the heated political dynamics in Massachusetts—were ultimately to gain a life of their own in the California political environment as an aftermath of the Fisher battle and subsequent problems with implementation of that law.

Strikingly, a more eminent national educator, James B. Conant, had also undertaken a comprehensive study of national teacher education policies and practices and his sweeping conclusions, *The Education of Teachers*, also appeared in 1963. As President Emeritus of Harvard and a considerable luminary and scholar, he was not in any sense a professional educator of the type viewed so negatively by Koerner. Yet Conant's overall views stand in marked contrast with Koerner's. Indeed, Conant did not develop a conspiracy theory, but viewed teacher education with a more moderate and accommodating lens:

> *In our travels to sixteen capitals, my colleagues and I tried to test an often-stated and rather widely-accepted charge: that there is in this country a national conspiracy on the part of certain professors and their friends to use the processes of teacher certification as a device for protecting courses in education and for maintaining a "closed shop" among teachers of the public schools who, as a result of the courses, will dependably follow the National Education Association (NEA) "party line." This conspiracy, it is argued, has been so successful that highly talented people are kept from the classrooms, and responsible laymen and distinguished scholars in the academic fields have been denied a voice in the formulation of programs of teacher education.*
>
> *I confess to having had some initial skepticism about this charge: first because I have generally found "devil" theories inadequate; and second, that any statement about a national situation in education fails to account for highly significant state-by-state variation. My present study has reinforced this skepticism, although I have seen more considerable evidence than one could use, with some distortion and considerable oversimplification, to support the charge* (Conant, 1963, 15).

Conant did have one view similar to Koerner's: he felt that a four-year higher education program for teachers was sufficient, provided "first, that an adequate high school

preparation be assured, and second, that the subjects studied are adequately distributed among general education, an area of concentration, and professional education" (Conant, 1963, 203-204). While he did not view education courses in quite the same light as Koerner, he found education courses relating to teaching methods and psychology of learning were almost meaningless until after teachers had struggled with problems of the classroom, that such work should be at a minimum prior to student teaching.[4]

In *Shaping Educational Policy*, his 1964 analysis of educational policy making, Conant contrasted the credentialing systems of California and New York and traced the history of the Fisher Act and its implementation. In his view, the California Legislature had become too prescriptive in credential requirements and had gone too far in limiting professional influence in educational development. Having studied the educational policy making patterns of many states, he was struck by the different structure and traditions in America's two largest states.

> *The Legislature is the source of authority in every state constitution. But tradition and custom play an enormous role in determining how this authority is employed . . . New York and California are at almost the extreme opposite ends of a wide spectrum of possibilities. The citizens of New York have come to expect that educational policies will not become footballs in the legislative halls, while Californians tend to believe that democracy requires that legislatures resolve all major educational issues* (Conant 1964, 82).

By mid-1968, it was decided that all members of Ryan's Joint Committee would benefit from first-hand contact with national educational reform leaders. Therefore, the Committee embarked on a series of nationwide travels to talk with key individuals. In June, 1968, they met with Wisconsin legislators, educators, and public officials. In October, they visited Olympia and Seattle, to meet with Washington legislators and

[4] Conant was quite also supportive of the "approved programs" approach for a state to validate the scope and quality of teacher education programs at colleges and universities as legitimate bases for issuing credentials, a notion that Koerner adamantly opposed.

educators. In November, they took their principal out-of-state trip to the East Coast, where they met with Kevin Harrington, the Majority Leader of the Massachusetts Senate, who had spearheaded the major educational reform package—inspired by Koerner—through the Massachusetts Legislature. They also met with representatives of the Massachusetts Advisory Council on Education, with leaders of several teacher unions, and with officials of the Arthur D. Little Company, the management consulting firm that in the mid-1960s, had studied the California State Department and had recommended its extensive reorganization. While in Boston, Committee members also met with Koerner, the first of such meetings, which furthered the contacts already initiated with Koerner by Doyle and Ryan. The Joint Committee journeyed to New York, where it scheduled meetings with a representative of the Ford Foundation, several highly active leaders of the neighborhood school movements, several principals of urban schools, and with teacher union leader Albert Shanker—whose influence upon educational thought was developing significantly.

When members of the Joint Committee returned to California, Doyle stayed on to explore one further area of inquiry: he met with officials at the Educational Testing Service (ETS) in Princeton to talk about how ETS expertise and services might fit into the Committee's future plans for legislation, particularly relating to the notion of testing procedures for teachers. Soon after, Doyle met in Washington with Mortimer Smith, a CBE founder and a prominent critic of public education in the 1950s and 1960s.

Armed with ideas gathered during this extensive travel, augmented with communication with leaders and scholars, books, and other background information—and prodded by the considerable drive from Ryan and Doyle, the Joint Committee was now in an excellent position to consider the development of draft legislation that would incorporate many of the major reform ideas to which they had been exposed, as well as to address the critical problems in the Fisher Act. The Joint Committee, including Ryan, now had a great deal more information and ideas than it had had upon conclusion of the two public hearings earlier in the year. It had a thorough exposure to broadly-based information about educational reform which could serve as rich preparation for a subsequent major proposal

to their legislative colleagues—as soon as such mix could be coherently organized for systematic consideration.

The "First" Ryan Act Takes Shape

To consider what should be done in preparation for the new legislative session, the Joint Committee then met in a two-day retreat in mid-December, 1968. Doyle developed a comprehensive discussion document for the retreat, in which he raised a significant number of rhetorical questions, based primarily upon the ideas and issues that had been presented to the Committee in 1968, particularly during their travel sessions, and intended to clarify purposes and directions for the Committee.[5] The Committee's decision, arising from its deliberations at this retreat, was to introduce an omnibus bill dealing with teacher preparation and credentialing. The Koerner proposals and the Massachusetts reform efforts would shape the framework of the intended legislation.

Early in January, 1969, Doyle developed a rough draft of the bill to accomplish this perceived intent. The draft included the radical, if not surprising, proposal for a teacher examination system, which would emphasize a minimum standard in subject matter background to be eligible for a teaching credential in a given area. Doyle sent the draft to a list of selected individuals for reaction—Koerner, selected academic professors who had met with members of the Committee, and few other "trustworthy" individuals. In the cover letter, Doyle indicated the draft's confidential nature, for the educational establishment was not notified of its existence. He knew that as soon as the draft bill was well known to the educational establishment, an uproar would occur, raising the possibility that his efforts might be hampered or derailed.

Doyle's draft also contained other important elements of a thoroughly changed system of teacher preparation and credentialing in California, many of which were to appear in the official version of the proposed bill when it was introduced in the 1969 session. In addition to the major component of an examination requirement, they included:

[5] It is not common practice to have a legislative committee so thoroughly prepared to debate and begin to craft a piece of legislation dealing with a substantive area of public policy; indeed the opposite is far more usual.

- A fifteen-member independent commission, outside the State Department of Education;

- A Baccalaureate Degree;

- Elimination of the academic/non-academic distinction contained in the Fisher Act and its implementation rules;

- A limitation in education course work for the teaching credential of nine semester-units; and

- retention of the fifth year of study, with an allowance of seven years to complete the requirement.

During the next several months, Doyle actively communicated with many sources of knowledge and influence—sending and receiving numerous letters, conducting many conversations with people from whom he wanted pertinent input, and in other ways assembling a body of content revolving around the draft legislation. For those in the know, Doyle evidenced during this time an unwavering belief in the validity of and the need for examinations for teachers. One example is a letter to ETS in which he stated that "examinations provide a more rational and equitable measure of subject matter mastery than [do] course and unit counting" (Lane, 1979, 176). Murdoch, who had now become the staff consultant to the Assembly Education Committee, was more than encouraging. He felt that examinations could serve as a "safety valve": exams would not only serve to cut the red tape in administering credential issuances and allow the qualification of out-of-state applicants who held education degrees; but they would also provide an alternative to the monopoly he perceived held by universities and colleges in academic certification. Certainly, avoiding the "monopoly" appealed to Ryan, in particular: it allowed a credential holder to become certified in a new teaching area without necessarily returning to college.

Doyle also had another concern about exams, which he suspected could become a major political impediment to the concept: charges that racial bias may exist in an examination system. So, before he or Ryan could marshal sufficient political support for the proposed bill, they had to overcome strong political opposition they expected from the minority community. Doyle was not concerned about the costs of examinations so much as about the bias issue. Therefore, prior to introducing the proposed bill in the Legislature, he wrote to Kenneth Clark,[6] at the Metropolitan Applied Research Center, about this issue:

> *The core of the bill is the examination. Unfortunately Senator [Mervyn] Dymally [an influential African-American legislator and a member of the Joint Committee] is opposed to examinations as a prerequisite for certification. My intention in requiring exams is to guarantee a minimum level of subject matter mastery regardless of the place or pattern of preparation. Thus, it would be no longer necessary to approve courses of study or institutions, to require certain majors and minors, or to count units and courses arbitrarily. I felt—and still do—that this procedure would work to the advantage rather than to the disadvantage of minority group teachers (Lane, 1979, 177).*

After describing the envisioned examination process, Doyle made it clear that he felt it important to secure Dymally's approval and that of other minority legislators and educators. He further elaborated on the design, process and policy setting aspects of the envisioned examination process. An important element in this policy setting would be that the proposed licensing commission, in setting passing scores, would hold public hearings and be assisted in the process by expertise derived from subject matter advisory panels composed of classroom teachers and university scholars in those subject areas. In the event that bias could not be eliminated, the proposed commission could establish procedures for "adjusting" the passing score. Clark's reply contained his support of

[6] It was Kenneth Clark's research on self-esteem in African American children which formed the central core of the argument for *Brown v Board of Education*, that separate facilities are inherently unequal.

examinations and his belief that it is be possible to develop examinations that were "equitable and workable."

These strong efforts of Ryan and Doyle had an unmistakably "anti-establishment" character, intended to realize the strong subject matter preparation espoused by Koerner, while also designed to disassemble the excessive central control by the state bureaucracy and teacher preparation institutions. As part of this same theme, the concept of a professional licensing body moved toward giving more authority, at a closer-to-the-grass-roots level, to classroom teachers and university subject matter scholars—as in medicine, law, and other professions.

As appealing as an independent licensing body might seem to the education community, educators voiced intense opposition to the proposal when they learned of the full dimensions of the draft bill. Doyle had wanted to have the concept paper reviewed and critiqued by credible resource persons before professional educators began their attack, and he had proceeded to carry out that process. However, he took one calculated gamble: in February, 1969, he sent a copy of the draft bill to Larson, who had been involved in the thick of various credential reform hearings—most often being placed in a highly defensive position. Naturally, Doyle had sent it with the hope that he would receive substantive, helpful, and unofficial advice from Larson.

Without a doubt, Larson's reaction differed dramatically from Doyle's, possibly naive, expectation. In a short time Doyle learned that other professional educators and their organizations had knowledge of the content of the draft. Indeed, the so-called "confidential" draft became so widely known prior to its official introduction in the Legislature that several major education-related organizations included it on meeting agendas for discussion and debate. The CSBA, for example, in March, 1969, published a two-page summary of the proposal, which included a technical analysis of its provisions, effects, and inconsistencies. Several other organizations and loosely-knit groups began forming arguments against specific provisions that concerned them; one broadly-based group, the Cooperative Committee on Teacher Credentials—a loose statewide alliance of

professional organizations—met in February, 1969, to discuss what they knew with Larson and several of his staff in attendance.

While Larson may not have been the only source who shared the draft bill with others, it was he who quickly became the target of Doyle's intense ire. Lane (1979, 180) analyzes the incident in these words:

> *Larson evidently had been stunned by the radical scope of the draft bill. The new teacher licensing board proposed in the [bill] would . . . spell the end of the existing bureau of credentials with the State Department and probably end his function as chief of teacher licensing operations. Furthermore, Larson was unusually sympathetic toward professional educators, especially those engaged in teacher preparation.*[7]

After angrily advising Larson that he may have placed the bill in jeopardy, Doyle sent the draft bill to several other professional educators, including several highly-placed staff members of the CTA, inviting their reactions.

Meanwhile, Doyle sought additional means to offset the possible charge of bias in examinations. He had already advised Senator Dymally, who he knew could prove to be a major obstacle to the concept, that Clark had looked positively upon the examination proposal, but he found Dymally unconvinced. Both Dymally and Senator Rodda had insisted that there be an alternative to examinations. This insistence eventually resulted in the provision of an approved subject matter program, later to be known as "waiver programs," as an alternative to the exam. Rodda, an educator, but not of the "professional" establishment and concerned for some time about extensive preparation requirements for elementary teachers, extracted this price for his support of examinations at all: Ryan was forced to include provision for a "diversified subjects" major for

[7] Over the years Larson had built a strong network with teacher educators, at least in good part through amicable and enduring relationships with the CCET, where he was Executive Secretary from 1956-1969.

elementary teachers—something that Rodda had sought for years, although the Fisher Act had incorporated such provisions.

With ample evidence that the cat was out of the bag, Ryan, Doyle and the Joint Committee were ready to introduce the bill.

AB 740 (the First Ryan Bill) Introduced

Shortly before the introduction of the Joint Committee's bill, the CTA, never resting in its desire to have greater control over the licensing of teachers—perhaps anticipating what Ryan was up to—worked with Assembly Member Waddie Deddeh to introduce AB 586 on February 10, 1969. If enacted, this bill would establish an eleven member State Board of Teachers' Standards and Practices, a giant step toward the "professionalization"—that is, self-regulation—of teachers that the CTA had long sought. The composition of this board would include ten members holding valid California teaching credentials—of these ten, two would teach in an accredited college or university and some representation of school administrators and junior college instructors would be possible; one member would be a member of the public. As proposed in the bill, the new board would assume all teacher credentialing and accreditation functions in California, removing all responsibility for these functions from the State Board and the State Department. Removing authority from the State Board and placing membership of the board almost entirely in the hands of educators was a far more radical and politically difficult idea than Ryan and Doyle had in mind. But the CTA continued to work on its own pragmatic ideas during a time of parallel deliberations about structural reforms in educational governance.

Ryan moved forward. A statement of "legislative intent," contained in the early passages of AB 740, served as a preamble for the extensive provisions of proposed new law—providing a remarkably soaring and perhaps contradictory promise of what this lengthy and, ironically, detailed bill would enact:

The Legislature, recognizing the need for excellence in education and the variety and vitality of California's many educational resources, intends to set broad minimum standards and guidelines for teacher preparation and licensing to encourage both standards and diversity. The Legislature intends that within the framework of state control school districts and teacher preparation institutions will develop programs which realistically meet the needs and resources of pupils, teacher candidates, school districts, and teacher preparation institutions.

Moreover, the Legislature finds that highly complex, detailed and prescriptive regulations governing the preparation and licensing of teachers and administrators frustrate imagination, innovation, and responsiveness. In addition, the Legislature finds that diversity of functions served by modern education requires licensing regulations which are flexible, realistic, responsive, and simple.[8]

AB 740 was, necessarily, complex, lengthy and comprehensive in scope; it contained "mega-provisions" dealing with major changes in the state's governance structure for educator preparation and credentialing, and it contained innumerable "mini-provisions" to flesh out the necessary details of what was to be accomplished in the mega-provisions. Seven key concepts framed this work:

1. First, and foremost, it was proposed that there be established a <u>new and semi-independent state agency</u>, to be titled the Commission on Teacher Preparation and Licensing (CTPL), which would have authority over all rules and regulations pertaining to the subject, yet (ambiguously) subject generally to the policies and objectives of the State Board of Education. However, with the intent of creating a politically viable model, as well as providing an almost ecumenical representation, the new body was to have, in addition to public school and higher education

[8] AB 122 of the 1970 Session contained, *verbatinm*, the same "preamble."

instructors, input from many of the major components of the state's educational structure: ex *officio* non-voting representations from the University of California (UC), the California State Colleges and Universities (CSU), the California Community Colleges, the State Board of Education, and the Coordinating Council on High Education.

2. Four kinds of credentials would be established:

   (a) "Regular" [basic] teaching credential with "levels" of school service—"self-contained" (principally the elementary school) and specific subject matter authorizations (principally the high school).

   (b) The Designated Subjects Credential for teachers of vocational education (welding, auto shop, and the like) and adult education.

   (c) The Designated Services Credential for professional personnel who served as librarians, in counseling, and the like.

   (d) The Administrative Services Credential for administrators, coordinators, and the like.

3. The academic/non-academic distinction of the Fisher Act would be eliminated, thus enabling individuals who majored in physical education, home economics, industrial arts, and the like, to obtain a credential equal in stature to other regular teaching credentials.

4. An undergraduate education major would not be valid for a credential (a continuation of the Fisher Act).

5. Teacher applicants would demonstrate competency in the subject matter of their choice by passing a subject matter examination or, if they completed a higher

education subject matter program approved by the CTPL, the examination could be "waived." Teachers would not be assigned to teach in an area for which they had not demonstrated competency.

6. A fifth year of study, which would be completed over a seven-year period from the issuance date of the initial credential.

7. A limit of nine semester units of education coursework to be required for a teaching credential. This limitation did not apply to requirements for student teaching, which was set as a semester of full-time student teaching, nor did it apply to other "advanced" credentials (administrative, for example).

Most members of the education community reacted with surprise, even shock, when the content of the bill became sufficiently known to them. The three provisions which aroused the greatest rhetorical intensity and active opposition were the creation of a separate agency, the examinations, and the education course unit limits. The State Board and the State Department were adamantly opposed to losing so much of their authority over so important a matter as educator preparation and licensing and made those views known to Ryan and other members of the Joint Committee. Some school district representatives became upset about the restructuring of the traditional governance structure, finding fault with various aspects of the proposed new, additional, state education agency with which they would have to contend.

The teacher education community, in turn, was intensely outraged by the proposed limitation on the amount of professional education course work that could be required for a teaching credential. The community had long before made peace with the fact that the education major was no longer legitimate in California and had learned to work with the Fisher Act's frown on professional education. But this latest proposal was unbearably benighted. Beside the perhaps obvious self-interest evidenced by this concern, there was a rationale for feeling that the limitation was ill-advised: how could a potential teacher learn his/her complex craft without having been exposed sufficiently to the fundamental body of knowledge which undergirds effective practice? Most teacher educators felt

passionately, as a professional matter, that nine semester units—a mere three courses—was a pitiful amount in which to equip a beginning teacher with the knowledge, skills, and values needed to become successful with a culturally diverse group of students and a complicated curriculum.

The third idea of intense concern was the radical, perhaps even punitive, idea of examinations for teachers. One skeptic, Lester Wahrenbrock, a school district personnel administrator and representative of a statewide personnel group, noted that few students fail to do well in school because their teachers are not well prepared in subject matter; from his experience students more often do poorly because their teachers were not competent in such teaching abilities and skills as classroom management, creating motivation to learn, adapting presentation styles to pupil learning modes, and the like. In other words, pedagogical competence was far more important than subject matter competence—and examinations were not able to measure teaching performance in these vital areas. Wahrenbrock's argument was not original or unique, for it was a common refrain in professional education circles since the advent of the subject matter emphasis of the Fisher Act. In addition, if California required examinations for teachers, it would be more difficult to recruit out-of-state individuals to teach in California, a situation that would exacerbate the problem of staffing schools with fully-qualified teachers in times of teacher shortage.

Other educational organizations wrote similar critiques and objections to various parts of the bill. Included in the groups opposing the bill—or major parts of it—were the California Council on the Education of Teachers (CCET), the Cooperative Committee on Teaching Credentials, all of the major administrator organizations, the deans of schools and departments of education throughout the state and, somewhat, the CTA, for it grew ambivalent about or opposed to some major parts of the bill while being supportive to other provisions. By May 1969 with support for its own AB 586 fading—and in the face of opposition from several prominent members of the Assembly, the CFT, representatives of some junior college faculty members, and the State Department—CTA was left with only the hope of working with Ryan to secure as independent a licensing body as politically possible. Ryan—convinced that educational policy making could not be left

exclusively to professional educators—provided a substantial voice for educators on his proposed commission but not an exclusive voice, one of the principle differences between the two bills.

In retrospect, the most intense and searing battles that occurred in the drive to enact the Ryan Act occurred during the struggle over the "first" Ryan Act, AB 740 in 1969, not over AB 122, the Ryan Act of 1970. As the "trail breaking" bill, AB 740 had major provisions encountered for the first time by elements of the education community and the state's governance structure, elements that caused intense consternation and resistance.

Soon after the introduction of AB 740, as was his style, Ryan called a press conference to trumpet the bill's features and values. He took pains to explain the amount of time and thought that had been given to the bill's content before its introduction. One of the main advantages of this bill, Ryan pointed out, was that it would allow dissemination of simple, clear, straightforward credential requirements and information—never achieved under the Fisher Act and certainly meant to be a compelling argument for the bill's passage. Then, among other things, he predicted that credentialing costs would be reduced by fifty percent; he touted the conceptual merits of the separate licensing commission; he explained the soundness of the examination system as a way to assure subject matter proficiency of newly credentialed teachers, with clear advantages over the inferior practice of merely counting courses and units taken, while assuring several forms of safeguards that could be built into the system; he emphasized the bill's preservation of the Fisher Act's basic thrust for subject matter competence in teachers and the elimination of education as a major. All in all, these highly visible pronouncements were intended to give momentum to the bill and to blunt the inevitable arguments raised in opposition to it.

Two days after Ryan's press conference, Eli Obradovich, a credential specialist in the Department, delivered a critical analysis of the bill to Larson, his boss. Briefly, Obradovich raised this points in criticizing Ryan's intentions:

1. It would be unwise to separate the function of overseeing teacher preparing and credentialing from the state agency responsible for school curriculum programs and state approved text books;

2. The proposed body would have a strong representation, if not control, by professional educators, where the State Board not only was principally of public make-up, it also had many advisory committees providing its expertise in addition to is firmly established professional staff in the Department;

3. The potential for conflict between this divided authority would be very possible;

4. The amount of detail contained in the Ryan bill foretold a great deal of the prescriptiveness and inflexibility in credential requirements;

5. The Ryan bill placed undue emphasis upon subject matter competence of pedagogical competence;

6. There would be too great a reliance upon examination results that might result in discriminatory screening of promising candidates.[9]

At the State Board's March meeting, Larson presented an analysis of the bill, which included the gist of Obradovich's complains along with additional defects that Larson found. The sole advantage of the Ryan proposals was the elimination of the academic/non-academic distinction. The Board was far from happy about this unpleasant news, for it had not ceased to wrestle with ways to better implement the Fisher Act. Indeed, it had become increasingly aware of the need to somehow simplify the credentialing processes. At this meeting, the Board reviewed and quickly approved a new policy on approved programs, by which the Board approved teacher education programs, which could then issue credentials. However, as Lane points out, there was a

[9] During the years immediate to 1969, civic rights organizations had been attacking all kinds of examinations -- both of the employment qualifications and academic progress types -- as continuing ways for discrimination to occur.

difference between what the Board approved and what become known as "approved programs" in later years under the Ryan Act.

> *These approved programs were not . . . the same as the CTPL approved academic programs that Ryan envisioned as an alternative or "waiver" to his examination system. [Rather] the State Board adopted an approved professional preparation program through which teacher education institutions would gain greater autonomy and flexibility (Lane 1979, 207).*

In taking this significant action the board probably hoped that this decision would lead to more efficient processing of credentials, less need to grapple with the onerous decisions about credentials, and even to slow the momentum of Ryan's radical proposals. Interestingly, this action did serve to cause a temporary delay for Ryan's bill in one of the Assembly's subcommittees, much to his chagrin, but the delay was not a serious one.

Board members had no direct source of information from Ryan's committee or staff, and almost all of their knowledge of the bill and its long term effects were received from Larson and Rafferty, who strongly opposed it. Not surprisingly, the State Board had little hesitation in voting to oppose AB 740 unless it was amended in ways acceptable to the Board. At the same time, the Board was apparently unaware of the legislature's negative attitudes toward the Board and, especially, toward Superintendent Rafferty and his top aides. Indeed, Ryan's proposal for an agency separate from the State Board and Rafferty's Department had begun to have a strong appeal because problems with the Fisher Act's implementation simply would not fade from the Board's monthly agenda. Nonetheless, the Board remained adamantly opposed to losing the credentialing authority that it held, despite the many difficulties that responsibility had been causing and voted to oppose AB 740. Its reactions and Larson's report only served to increase the Joint Committee's hostility.

With the continuous assaults upon the bill from angry or concerned parties, Ryan and Doyle began to amend the bill and to deflect the opposing arguments, while holding onto the major principles of the bill. Each time the bill was heard at an Assembly committee,

Ryan was there to testify to the bill's value and promise for the improvement of all aspects of teacher preparation and credentialing, and to emphasize the extensive work of the legislature's own Joint Committee, composed of a broad political spectrum represented by its six co-authors. Ryan continued to tout projected values of the bill's examination system, noting that most trades and professions had examinations required as bases for state licensing, while illustrating the additional values and special uniqueness of his approach: "the examinations would permit teaching outside of one's major field upon demonstration of competency. Not only could journalists teach English and legislators teach social studies, engineers could teach math—so long as they pass the examination and hold an BA" (Lane 1979, 21).

The revision process continued as Ryan and Doyle sought to meet objections and to further clarify their intentions and structures within the bill. Among these amendments were: changing the composition and means of appointment of members of the proposed commission; clarifying the role of the Committee of Credentials—a sub-group of this commission; adding authority to oversee teacher education program standards and approval of such programs; adding authority to develop and implement administrative law (Title 5) that would give specific interpretation to the broader statements of the basic credential law, heretofore the role of the State Board; adding a statement that would establish a closer tie between this commission and the State Board—that is, giving the State Board a bit more control over the agency than in the original version of the bill; and authorizing classroom teachers to be part of the panels of educators who would conduct formal reviews of teacher education programs.

By the end of May, 1969, a considerably amended version of AB 740 was sent with a "do pass" recommendation from the Assembly Education Committee to the next step in the process, the Assembly Ways and Means Committee, where it was further amended. These latest amendments addressed primarily the functions and operations of the new agency: setting fees to cover certain costs of operation; expanding the vision for initiatives that the commission could undertake (research and evaluation of programs). This version of the amended bill was in print by June 12, 1969. Within a few days the

bill overcame one of the prime legislative barriers to progress: it was passed by the full Assembly and sent to the Senate, where it would face another daunting gantlet.

AB 740 Moves to the Senate

Ryan had repeatedly not only extolled the inherent values of the examination concept but also maintained that such process for obtaining teaching credentials would result in considerable cost savings to the state, in particular because of the greater efficiencies in determining the competence of credential applicants and the reduced processing times involved—meaning, also, lower payroll costs. In a concerted effort to bolster this argument, he asked the Legislative Analyst Office for a formal opinion on the costs and, especially, savings that could result from passage of the measure. His request went to A. Alan Post, the Legislative Analyst, a man who had gained a strong reputation for competence, integrity, and objectivity. Post soon sent Ryan a favorable review of the bill's costs, estimating that establishment of the examination system would, indeed, save a considerable amount of money per year—Post stated $650,000—because it would no longer be necessary to carry out the detailed analysis of transcripts from each credential applicant. However, Post did perceive one area of ambiguity: he noted that the bill's provisions for "waiver" of exams might lead to unknown additional costs, depending on the process to verify the soundness of programs. Ignoring the caution in Post's report, Ryan cited its favorable parts in subsequent press releases.[10]

AB 740 was now to be reviewed by the Senate, where its first stop would be the Senate Education Committee. Lowery, the Committee's staff consultant, was highly knowledgeable about the content and thrust of the Assembly bill, for he had been in ongoing contact with Doyle as the drafting was completed. Lowery had even suggested a set of the categories of subjects that the new credential law might specify and in other ways consulted with Doyle and Ryan. Lowery, unlike Doyle, was a former public school

[10] As it would turn out, Post's caution about program verification costs would come to be seen as almost omniscient: when program review processes became established, an integral part of Ryan Act implementation, the associated costs became a major cost item. Additionally, the projected savings of the examination system did not, for once, predict accurately what eventually happened. Due to a number of important decisions and factors, savings of the magnitude projected by Post's report were not to be achieved.

teacher and school administrator and was very well informed about schools. In addition, as consultant to the other major education committee in the legislature, he was well abreast of other educational matters to come before it. Further, Senator Rodda, one of his legislative bosses, was not only a member of Ryan's Joint Committee but also an influential member and Chair of the Senate Education Committee. Rodda had been an active inquirer and activist on educational matters for quite some time and, even more importantly in this context, was co-author or AB 740. Both Rodda and Dymally, as co-authors of Ryan's Assembly bill and two of the most influential members of the Senate at this time, had participated in many of the discussions and trade-offs that had occurred during the amendment process in the Assembly—Dymally on the racial bias factor in examinations, and Rodda on the diversified major factor as a waiver to subject examination for elementary teachers.

Lowery, himself, for a time had genuine doubts about the practicality and validity of subject examinations but ultimately was persuaded by Doyle and CTA representatives that such examinations either existed or could be developed. He came to believe that the baccalaureate degree would assure that a teacher was reasonably well educated and that the examination would then assure a minimum knowledge in one of the eleven "umbrella" categories that Lowery had identified for the secondary school or the multiple subject area for the elementary school. Although only a staff member, Lowery played a pivotal role in the ultimate outcome of Ryan's efforts. So, while the thought of examinations was an anathema to the education community, the way had been cleared for many legislators to accept the concept.

In June the Senate Education Committee's first hearing on the bill gave additional opportunity to testify on the demerits of the proposal. By that time the State Board had issued a lengthy analysis of the bill, in which they found four major objections:

- The new state agency would further fragment responsibility for education in California.

- The new state agency would probably be dominated by professional educators—too narrow a focus for a public policy making body.

- The cost of developing the examinations called for in the bill would be enormously expensive, and the process would not be a savings to the State.

- The limitation on professional education would not be a good idea because of its prescriptiveness and lack of flexibility for all concerned.

Although no longer pursuing its own bill, the CTA was still a strong potential enemy. It sought changes that would raise standards for credentials and give more professional autonomy to the profession through the proposed new state agency. It wanted even more educators, that is teachers, on the proposed CTPL than the bill provided, a retention of the traditional nomenclature of credentials which the bill proposed to greatly change, and a minimum of a baccalaureate degree for issuance of an emergency credential. As Doyle communicated with the CTA and offered amendments that might satisfy the organization, he kept in mind that he had to balance those offerings with the realization that each amendment might engender strong opposition from another quarter.

Now in the Senate, the same organizations came again to the fore to object to aspects of the bill and/or seek amendments in their favor or to defeat the bill. The bill's momentum began to slow as Senate Education Committee hearings continued. The CSBA, for example, sought to have an end to life credentials for educators; it also sought to have teachers allowed to be assigned to teach outside their major areas of subject preparation. Continuing objections were heard from the State Department and, of course, the State Board, each having specific points of criticism.

By early July, 1969, the bill was in serious trouble in the Senate Education Committee, despite the influential support from within the legislature. Doyle and Ryan, with Lowery's help, sought constantly to draft amendments that would meet objections but would not lose the main thrust of the bill. Some of these amendments were more cosmetic than substantive in nature; other changes were more administrative process

provisions than substantive; others were genuine concessions, such as adding the statement in one version that the new commission would be "under the exclusive control and direction of the State Board" (Lane 1967, 225). But these concessions did not placate the State Board, for it continued its campaign of opposition.

Even with Ryan's July 11 concession amendments, AB 740 continued to face opposition because of features that Ryan had not changed. The examination system continued to be the most prominent and most visibly attacked during hearings. Senator Dymally now announced that he would not vote for the bill, even though Ryan and Doyle thought they had removed Dymally's concerns about possible racial bias. The representative of the Association of California School Administrators (ACSA) urged the Committee to hold the bill for interim study, reminding members of the problems resulting from hasty approval of the Fisher Act in 1961.

By mid-July, the CTA reached a pragmatic conclusion, observing that "it is a Sacramento axiom that no bill is perfect and such weaknesses may be subject to later changes" (Lane 1979, 228) and decided that because its own bills (AB 586 and SB 708) had failed, it was time to work with the author of AB 740. The organization's legislative operatives then began working closely with Ryan and the two committee consultants to shape the bill to their interest as much as possible. CTA still was not satisfied with the provisions that required examinations and a limitation on professional education but was willing to bide its time for the present.

As the struggle to kill versus maintaining its viability ensued, additional inconsistencies developed in the content of the bill as Ryan grudgingly made concessions. One example illustrates the nature of these contractions: an amended version would require an administrative credential candidate who completed an approved administrative preparation program to fulfill the diversified subject major, while another candidate who passed the examination for the administrative credential—the latter a permanent feature of the bill—could fulfill any major.

After the long saga of concessions in the amendment-making process, continued hearings, and numerous consultations between opponents and Ryan and his aides, the bill

ultimately cleared the Senate Education Committee and was sent to the Senate Finance Committee for review of its financial impact. AB 740 passed muster in that important committee and went to the Senate floor, where it was passed on 4 August 1969, by a 27 to 2 vote.

On August 21, the bill arrived on Governor Ronald Reagan's desk, needing his signature to become law. Ryan did not rest in his campaign to have it enacted; he knew that, as with any highly controversial bill, disappointed opponents would direct their arguments and pressures toward the Governor in a concerted effort to obtain a veto. With that knowledge, Ryan held a press conference to tout his bill, pointing out the overwhelming votes it had received in both houses, its bipartisan authorship, the substantial savings that would occur, and other notable features of the bill.

Uncharacteristically, the *Sacramento Bee*, especially, and the Los Angeles *Times* had paid scant attention during 1969 to so important an educational reform bill as it moved through the tortuous maze of the Legislature. But, upon passage of the bill, both papers editorially urged the Governor to sign it.

In another decisive action, Ryan directed a letter from himself and co-authors—Assembly Members Veysey and Dent; Senators Harmer, Dymally, and Rodda—to the Governor which urged him to sign the bill (Dymally apparently having been finally won over to Ryan's way of thinking on examinations).

As is customary in state law-making practices, the Legislative Counsel—the Legislature's lawyer—prepared an exhaustive analysis of the bill for the Governor as a basis for determining whether to sign or veto it. The Legislative Counsel found numerous inconsistencies, ambiguities, and actual conflicts between provisions in the bill and existing statutes. The analysis and its findings of problems covered thirteen single spaced pages. Lane speculates that "Doyle and Lowery had not been scrupulous in finding the bill's technical inconstancies, probably because they had no effective working relationship with technical specialists in the State Department's credential office" (Lane 1979, 231).

Despite Ryan's depiction of its overwhelming support in many important quarters—including CTA's cautious approval—the intense opposition of the State Board, in particular, along with the State Superintendent and the State Department, Governor Reagan vetoed AB 740 on 4 September 1969. Conceivably, he may have also been influenced by the substantial negative findings of the Legislative Counsel.

After several years of intensive and extensive preparation and relentless campaigning for a major reform bill, Ryan and his allies had apparently met a crushing defeat, one that otherwise might have ended a major public policy drive and have discouraged for a time significant efforts to have impact upon the quality of California's public schools. Yet Ryan's drive to have a major education reform bill to carry his name was not to end so suddenly, for he was to introduce AB 122 in the 1970 legislative session—AB 122 was a near carbon copy of AB 740, at least at the outset. There is a great deal of evidence that a mere year later that second bill had far less overall difficulty in negotiating the tortuous legislative course and obtain the same Governor's signature.

Inevitably, the question arises: why did the bill meet so clear a defeat in 1969, yet experience success a mere twelve months later, particularly when the 1970 bill differed so very little from its predecessor? The Governor's 1969 salient veto message gives several compelling clues:

> *Reason for Veto: There it little doubt that a major overhaul is very much needed in the areas of teacher preparation, evaluation, and credentialing. Scarcely a voice has been raised to the contrary. It is also obvious that it would be desirable to develop as is stated in AB 740, licensing regulations which are "flexible, realistic, responsible, and simple." It is also clear that the need for improvement are so great that impatience is present in many quarters.*
>
> *In view of the above, it is perhaps not surprising that responsible and informed people of the greatest good will argue with intensity on both*

sides, for and against, AB 740. Within its many broad, complex, and innovative provisions, there are some things to please most. There are also some things which give concern to many. I veto this bill at this time not because I wish to discourage attempts at change in this area; on the contrary, I encourage change in the area covered by the bill. In my charge to the Commission on Educational Reform [which Reagan created in 1969], teacher preparation and credentialing was stated to be of high priority.

Because so many responsible educators report sections of the bill which they "don't understand," because of elements within the bill which are seen by some as contradictory, because there is a major question as to whether testing for measuring the qualifications of teachers is a hope for the future or a proven dinosaur of the past, because there are questions regarding the jurisdiction and responsibility of the State Board of Education in its relationships to the commission suggested by AB 740, and, finally, because where there are so many questions, it would be so much better to develop clear answers before, and not after, a bill becomes law, I veto this measure—but express my hopes that the legislature, the Commission on Educational Reform, and others will see the basic elements of AB 740 as provocative and worthy of study and discussion. I hope that AB 740 will serve as a stimulus and that its veto will not serve to discourage consideration of change in an area needed it badly, and I assume that by the next legislative session we will have a strong consensus around a clearly understood and well developed program of legislation—or changes in policy and procedures within present departments and boards to improve the preparation, evaluation, and certification of teachers.

Accordingly, I am returning the bill unsigned (Reagan quoted in Inglis 1974b, 5-6 [emphasis *added]).*

The "Second" Ryan Act

One important political event in mid-1969 had significant effect upon the final form of the Ryan Act, yet it was not directly connected to AB 740 as it struggled through the Legislature's roadblock. That event—occurring concurrently to Ryan's shepherding his bill through the Legislature and obliquely referenced in the Governor's veto message—was the appointment on July 28, 1969 of the Governor's Commission on Education Reform. Reagan issued the following "charge" to this body:

> *The goal of this distinguished group of citizens will be to view the entire elementary and secondary credential process and to make recommendations to me to improve its effectiveness and the quality of the teaching of all our children.*
>
> *I should like to see particular attention given to the following areas: reforms in the areas of public school financing, teacher training and certification processes, salaries and the possibility of a merit system, districting, urban and suburban needs, organization and management of school administration, classroom practices and curriculum development, including campus unrest.*
>
> *A preliminary report, including a recommendation regarding the future of the commission, will be expected in December (Governor's Commission 1969, 1).*

The scope of the new commission's charge was considerably broader than Ryan's efforts, which focused on teacher preparation and credentialing exclusively. It was probably obvious to any knowledgeable person that no credible study and summary of findings for so complex a field could actually be achieved in less than five months. However, a

"preliminary" report was put together by December, while the final report was not transmitted until more than a year.

In its preliminary report, the Governor's Commission presented a number of interesting, even radical and, in some instances, enduring suggestions. It criticized the state's teacher preparation and credentialing system, recommending establishment of a separate licensing agency similar to those proposed by Koerner, Ryan, and the CTA in their several efforts. The Commission ventured these additional "radical" suggestions: that there be a single credential for all levels of teaching; no credential requirements for non-teaching positions(administrators and the like); creation of a series of instructional "ranks" for teachers; and continuing education requirements for teachers so that their knowledge would regularly be brought up to date. Many of these suggestions were so far from traditional practice that they may have seemed almost preposterous, yet several—in addition to the notion of a separate licensing body—came to have a life of their own in the ultimate outcome of the battle to enact the Ryan bill. Not surprisingly, Ryan and the Governor's Commission were not philosophically far apart, but initially Ryan believed that this Commission's suggestions were so radical that they would generate unbeatable political resistance and would be unable to be adopted in the legislature. Nonetheless, during the deliberations surrounding the legislative progress of Ryan's second bill, AB 122 in 1970, the Commission's Executive Director Stanley Green worked diligently to have those provisions relating to preparation and credentialing incorporated into the Ryan bill or any other legislative medium available.

Reagan's veto of AB 740 did not discourage Ryan from moving ahead in his determination to have a major educational reform law enacted with his name on it. On the contrary, he redoubled his efforts to secure such legislative success. Among other things, he was convinced—especially in light of the Governor's words of encouragement in the veto message—that he needed to marshal additional support for his package of ideas, not necessarily to change them. During the legislative recess between December, 1969 and January, 1970, Ryan and Doyle visited schools out-of-state which yielded additional insights and ammunition, particularly related to school successes with minority students. As Ryan conducted these outreach efforts to other states—including Florida,

Washington DC, and New York City—he made a special point to consult with independent thinkers who were writing about non-traditional educational practices or doing innovative work in non-traditional settings. In addition to talking with William Johntz and Seymour Gang, educational innovators working with inner city students and using unique processes, he and Doyle met with Joseph Featherstone of the *New Republic*, a critic of education and on the staff of the CBE. These conversations enhanced Ryan's reputation as an independent and visionary thinker himself, one who knew his way around what was happening on the cutting edge of experimental educational thought and practice and who also knew what was wrong with accepted practice and policies. He and Doyle corresponded regularly with advisors that he trusted, including Koerner, Conrad Briner of The Claremont Graduate School (who was briefly a member of the Governor's Commission, who knew Koerner, and who was later appointed to the CTPL), Charles Brown of the Ford Foundation, and others. Koerner's views had by now become fairly well-known to most legislators and the education community, due in good part to Ryan's publicity of Koerner's recommendations to the Massachusetts Legislature and to Ryan's Joint Committee in 1969.

At the beginning of the 1970 legislative session, Ryan was again passed over as Chair of the Assembly Education Committee (he had failed in that quest in 1969 as well), but did retain his role as Chair of the Joint Committee on Teacher Licensing and Public School Employment—a role which was vital to his ambitions. On January 2, 1970, he introduced AB 122, a sixty-one page replica of the vetoed AB 740. As further preparation for the oncoming battles, Ryan continued a campaign to gain national publicity for this legislation while his new bill was being considered by the California Legislature. In early 1970 Ryan sent to Martin L. Gross, a reporter for the *Los Angeles Times*,[11] a publicity packet in support of the bill, including contributions to its content by Koerner, Featherstone, and other prominent supporters. Ryan suggested that Gross might write an article for a national audience about the state of teacher education and California efforts to reform it. Gross responded by writing "Courses in 'Education': Worthless for

[11] Gross, a bitter critic of teacher preparation -- especially education courses and "educationists" -- had written a scathing article on these topics early in 1969. Ryan responded with a letter of strong praise of Gross's feature article deriding low standards in teacher education, the faculty who taught them, and even the caliber of college students enrolled in education.

Teachers," a repetition of an earlier piece but now including an update of information about AB 122. He endorsed these reform efforts, which added to Ryan's political momentum.

An additional arrow in the Ryan quiver was an article in the February 1970 issue of the politically influential periodical, *California Journal*, a publication well-read in legislative and other political circles. In its usual and ostensibly objective style, the *Journal* analyzed the recently introduced AB 122, gave a summary of the work of the Joint Committee, forecast the nature and sources of opposition to the bill, and predicated that the work of the Governor's Commission would likely be in concert generally with the content of the Ryan bill. If this were to occur, it could result in a politically acceptable package for the Governor, who could then be in a position to sign it. Ryan and Doyle glowed in this favorable review and used it in the publicity campaign during the first half of 1970.

Prior to the bill's first hearing, Ryan had intensified his campaign within the legislature itself, first by sending letters to his colleagues to remind them of the purposes of AB 740, of its support in 1969, and the evolution of AB 122. He reminded them of the pertinent parts of the Governor's veto message than had held open the door for credential reform and sent a packet of other information and promotional materials. In addition, in a confident and calculated move, he invited other legislators to become co-authors of the bill—an effort that resulted by February 25 in more than ten Assembly Members joining as co-authors. With all of these factors going for him, Ryan thought that he well might gain sufficient momentum this time around.

Yet, as the hearings began, it became evident that however much support Ryan may have gained within the Legislature, there was not an across-the-board support for all components of the bill among the many special interest groups. The CTA, for one, while it at the end had not actually opposed Ryan's first bill, still had ideas of features that it wanted and testified that it had not taken a position. Various other groups and agencies that had been seen and heard often in opposition to major reform initiatives since 1961 rose to be heard again. Now, however, most of these groups—which included the State

Department, the State Board, and the Cooperative Committee—began to modify their views and requested various amendments, rather than taking a stridently opposing stance. All, that is, except Manfred Schrupp, now the President of CCET, who apparently broke ranks with other members of his organization, for he testified vigorously against the bill. He argued for having minimum standards for credentials developed by a new commission rather than having them fixed in law by the Legislature. He testified that the limitation of nine units of education, contained in the bill, was "grossly inadequate," and that a competency examination system fixed into law would be impractical. If exams were to be introduced, it was better, he believed, to let the new commission set criteria for all aspects of the process. In short, he made clear his condemnation of the proposed legislation, and there is little question that Ryan knew that intense opposition from schools of education would continue during this legislative session.

As a result of this testimony, little of which was favorable to the bill, the Assembly Subcommittee held over the bill for further hearings and awaited amendments sought by the several major groups that had appeared before it. During the week of February 23, the Subcommittee held its second hearing on AB 122, at which time the bill was significantly amended. The CTA, for its part, still wanted additional professional teachers on the proposed commission, other changes in composition, and elimination of the nine units of professional education; the representatives of the Cooperative Committee warned the subcommittee against creating another period of lengthy chaos like that following the "hasty" passage of the Fisher Act. Green presented the Governor's Commission's position on eliminating both life credentials and school administration credentials and on establishing a single teaching credential for grades kindergarten through twelve. Ryan, never eager to concede when he did not have to, responded that he believed that the bill in its present form was acceptable to most legislators and that he would permit only those changes that the Governor himself insisted upon.

A week after this hearing, the full Assembly Education Committee approved the bill after only perfunctory discussion of an amendment to eliminate the driver education credential. As seemingly minor as this action appeared at the time, like the physical education controversy during the Fisher legislation, it aroused intense opposition and marshaled a

vigorous campaign to retain the credential. Ryan soon became engaged in a bitter word battle with the group, which continued for some time (Lane 1979, 248).

As the bill appeared more and more likely to pass the Assembly, several of the state's major educational organizations sought to further moderate their opposition by suggesting amendments that would favor their views. The CSBA, for example, asked for additional public members to be appointed to the proposed new commission, wanted the new commission to be placed under the authority of the State Board, and supported continuing education for teachers. Ryan granted some of these requests, and in May 1970 CSBA had moved to an "approve" position, even though it still had a number of concerns, and kept working with the Ryan and Lowery to gain additional amendments.

The State Board, of course, continued, indeed intensified, its firm and active opposition to nearly all elements of AB 122, even though Ryan maintained that he had amended the bill many times to try to satisfy the Board's, and the Department's, concerns.[12] The Board became so active that it sponsored SB 825, introduced by Senator Clair Burgener on March 31, that would repeal the Fisher Act and create—within the State Department—a new commission, entitled the Commission on Professional Standards and Practices, that would have a semblance of separate "professionalism" but remain completely under the control of the State Board.

Meanwhile, the Governor's Commission, while not gaining from Ryan all that it wanted, developed a fairly positive view of the bill, certainly an advantage for Ryan. Other groups—primarily professional special interest associations, like the members of the Cooperative Committee—which had been relatively unified in opposition to the 1969 version of the bill, over the months in the first half of 1970 became less unified on positions to the 1970 version, thereby providing Ryan additional advantage. The CTA, for example, one of the strongest members of the alliance, had begun to signal support of the bill, indicating the crumbling of resistance.

[12] The State Board wanted what Ryan would never yield: to make the proposed new commission merely an "advisory body" to it.

Fairly early in 1970, having passed out of the Assembly Education Committee, AB 122 was heard by the Assembly Ways and Means Committee, potentially a major roadblock to progress. Again Ryan had marshaled significant support for the bill to testify before this committee: the Governor's Commission favored nearly all of the bill; Assembly Member Veysey, a co-author, urged a yes vote; both the Legislative Analyst and the State Department of Finance had no objections to the bill[13]—which was significant information for this particular committee. The Ways and Means Committee found in the bill's favor, sending it to the full Assembly, where it passed on March 16 by a vote of 60 to 3.

While AB 122 was still in the Assembly, but anticipating its success, Ryan and his staff, as usual, prepared extensive updated information packets about the bill, sending them to all members of the Senate. The packets contained clippings, articles, identifications of the bill's supporters and opponents, a history of the bill—all in all an impressive bundle of campaign information.

By the time that AB 122 was to be heard by the Senate Education Committee, however, a rash of bills related in general to credentials, teacher qualifications, and state educational agencies had been introduced in the Senate. Senator Burgener's SB 825, sponsored by the State Board was one; Senator Grunsky introduced SB 1245, similar to his (and CTA's) SB 708, which had died in 1969; and Senator Rodda introduced SB 1206, designed to change the credential requirements but not establish a new state agency. Again, the CTA bill—Grunsky's SB 1245—had little chance for passage in competition with the Ryan bill, but Rodda's bill had some ideas in it that Rodda had firmly held for years, particularly the need for a diversified subject major for elementary teachers.

So when the Senate Education Committee began its formal hearing process in April 1970, it had three credentialing bills to consider. The Committee decided to consolidate the hearings on the bills, but the bulk of the testimony focused on AB 122. From the testimony, Ryan and his staff knew they had not yet obtained the degree of consensus the Governor's veto message had asked. ACSA, represented by almost-revered Gordon

[13] Prior to the hearing, all Assembly members received the Legislative Analyst's report that the bill would save the state as much as

Winton, a former respected legislator, voiced clear opposition; Green of the Governor's Commission still called for a single credential for all teachers and the total elimination of school administration credentials. The CTA stated that it was still working with Ryan to obtain amendments. It further maintained its opposition to the nine unit limit on professional course work in education, to the elimination of administration credentials, and to the Governor's Commission proposals for a single credential and elimination of the life credential. Indeed, the CTA had voted to oppose AB 122 if these provisions became a part of the bill. The CTA representatives, of course, declared their preference for SB 1245, the Grunsky bill which they sponsored.

Others who spoke in opposition included the State Board and representatives of several groups who were members of the Cooperative Committee. But the most notable, if not the most colorful, witness was Dr. S.I. Hayakawa, who had captured the imagination of millions of people during one dramatic moment as an activist college president defying the chaotic actions of rebellious student during the turbulent days of the 1960s and had become a hero to many legislators and to Governor Reagan himself.[14] Much to Ryan's disappointment, his mentor Hayakawa testified in opposition to the bill, although Ryan had written to him, urging this support. Because of who he was, Hayakawa's stance carried significant weight, at least at the time of the testimony.

The intense and continuing pressure from the State Board through its president, Howard Day, forced the Senate Education Committee to hold a series of hearings on the three credential reform bills, continuing into mid-1970, although for all intents and purposes, the only bill that mattered was AB 122. Indeed, Rodda's own bill, SB 1206, was not formally heard—that is in public session—by the Committee, yet several of its key ideas became amended into AB 122 along the way. One of these was the diversified major for elementary teachers; another would allow a teacher's assignment to a subject area in which that teacher had taken eighteen semester units of college work—a means to make more flexible the classroom assignment of teachers and, thereby, to decrease the problems that had plagued the school districts under the Fisher Act.

$600,000.

During these ongoing deliberations, Ryan continued his campaign to gain even broader support. He maintained communications with Alex Sherrifs, the Governor's advisor for education, and other staff members. He also took pains to garner the understanding and support of several key conservative senators that might be persuaded to ask the Governor to sign the bill when it reached his desk. One of those senators was already in his camp: Senator John Harmer had been a member of the Joint Committee and a co-author of both AB 740 and AB 122. He courted another conservative, Senator John Stull, who had been active in introducing other educational legislation over the years, so successfully that Stull wrote a constituent that he favored AB 122 over a fellow senator's bill—Burgener's bill, sponsored by the State Board. Ryan later gave credit to Stull for being instrumental in having the bill pass the Senate.

Prior to resumption of hearings in early June, Ryan and his staff sent each Senate Education Committee member an updated briefing package, which had been carefully prepared. Its contents included: the purpose of the bill; its special features; a detailed comparison between AB 122 and the other two credential bills; an argument that his bill would significantly save money and increase efficiency in the state credentialing process; a justification for the nine unit limit on professional education course work and the use of examinations for credentialing; and a declaration that AB 122 was the only true reform bill that would make major change. He offered to accept amendments that were among the recommendations of the Governor's Commission, "so long as there is strong support from the Governor's Office and the Senate Education Committee" (Lane 1979, 267).

As a result of the June hearing, Ryan again made significant amendments: he softened the strict unit limit on education course work to make it clear that it applied only to restricting the requirements prerequisite to student teaching, having the effect of making the stipulation a minimum rather than a maximum; he redesigned the classifications of several credentials, teaching and non-teaching, to be more like a "single" credential that the Governor's Commission had spoken for—by making the authorizations for all subject areas and services applicable to all grade levels, grades one through twelve; and he

[14] Hayakawa was a nationally known linguist long prior to his appointment as president of San Francisco State College, where the incident occurred, but his academic standing would have mattered for little in this arena.

clarified other sections. Further, he struck back at the State Board that had worked so hard to defeat him: he returned provisions to the bill that would give the proposed new commission greater autonomy, by including language that made only administrative regulations developed by the new commission subject to Board review. This move, in effect, allowed the new commission to operate almost totally free of State Board control—and would further alienate it. He also angered another special interest group, the driver education community, by reducing considerably the requirements for driver education teachers in school districts.

For his extensive efforts in pursuing a means to effect major reform in teacher preparation and credentialing in California, Ryan had gained considerable state as well as national renown as a fearless and effective political thinker and innovator. As evidence of Ryan's imminent success with this bill, his co-author Dymally—once nearly an opponent of the bill—offered to sponsor an amendment that would name the law after Ryan, the so-called "tombstoning" practice of legislative courtesy often carried out by legislators for major pieces of legislation. Ryan, a Democrat, resisted this overture, fearing that such designation could be a negative factor with the Republican Governor. Instead, he suggested that the tombstone provision could be included in a follow-up bill that he planned to introduce after passage of AB 122 that would serve to refine and "clean up" provisions of the preceding bill.

After the extensive and important amendments of June 12 appeared in print, Ryan contacted the Governor's Commission to point out how many of their changes he had incorporated, even though not all of their recommendations had been fully met. He urged the Commission to support the bill. Ryan and his staff continued cautiously making various relatively minor amendments whenever they felt it necessary without losing the major elements.

By June 23, the bill passed the Senate Education Committee and was sent to the next stage of review, the Senate Finance Committee, which had little difficulty with the bill in the form presented to it and passed it out. The bill then moved to the floor of the Senate. On July 21, the Senate passed the bill; on July 22, the Assembly concurred with the

numerous amendments made in the bill while it was on the Senate side, and bill moved on to the Governor's desk on July 27. As it awaited the Governor's review, Ryan documented the considerable and broadly based support his bill how had, including among others: several key conservative Republicans; the California Taxpayers League, the CSBA, (tacitly) the CTA, and, most importantly, the Governor's Commission. Obviously, the Governor's Commission was of unequaled weight in the crucial political balance of that moment. It was the Governor's own advisory body, one that he was close to and could trust; furthermore, the fact that it supported AB 122 showed that Ryan has gained more than a semblance of the broad support Reagan had called for in his 1969 veto message.

Opposition persisted, however. The State Board, composed of gubernatorial appointees, marshaled every means at hand to convince the Governor to veto the bill, including a thirteen page legal analysis of the bill, which reported numerous inconsistencies and defects and recounted the number of times the bill had been changed during its course through the Legislature. Probably its strongest arguments was that enactment would create a situation fraught with possibilities for jurisdictional battles and impasses if the State Board and the new commission were to disagree on the commission's new policy adoptions. The State Board's document concluded by indicating that the signing of AB 122 would result in chaos, confusion, inefficiency, and other troubles for the state. State Superintendent Rafferty, a constitutional officer and a Republican, tried to bring his weight to bear to convince the Governor to veto the bill, also predicting chaos. He offered to sponsor a simple bill in the next legislative session that would address the reforms needed. By this time, however, elected official or not, Rafferty had become an anathema to most legislators and an embarrassment to the Republican administration. His efforts counted for little, especially in the impressive support that had been marshaled behind the bill.

On July 30, Governor Reagan signed AB 122 into law, as the Teacher Preparation and Licensing Law of 1970—later known as the "Ryan Act." The long saga to enact a major reform milestone was ended, a decidedly new era in state policy and governance structure for educator preparation and credentialing in California was about to begin.

The same forces to enact the Fisher Act in 1961 were at play during the Ryan legislation in 1969-1970. The drive for standards for academic rigor and for simplified credentialing—these account for part of the drive. Other strong forces, in counter reaction to the Fisher Act also served to strengthen the momentum. In July 1973, Ryan—by then a Congressman—In brief, the Ryan Act developments are outlined these forces:

a. Under the previous Fisher Act the number of credentials in California had proliferated to the point were the legislative analysts were able to identify 340 separate credentials.

b. The cost of credentials for a teacher rose from $8 to $20 in less than ten years.

c. The length of time for issuance of a teaching credential went from less than 30 days to more than nine months in that same ten year period.

d. Most important of all, students themselves and classroom teacher had indicated in the Arnold Report of the State Senate that courses in education on college campuses had little value for the practicing teacher, and the schools of education in the State were requiring an incredible number of education courses in order to obtain a credential (Ryan letter, July 7, 1973).

Lowery explained the forces this way: he had worked hard in the Senate, along with Doyle in the Assembly, to assemble as sponsors of AB 122 a broader panoply of political perspectives than had been true for AB 740.[15] "We tried for a well-balanced bill, politically, for a number of reasons. No only could generate strong opposition to it. We tried to make it a classic case of compromise" (Lowery interview 1971).

[15] Larson was referring to the support of conservative senators as well as moderate to liberal legislators, the Governor's appointees to the Reform Commission, and certain special interest groups.

Summary

Ryan's analysis, along with Lowery's, give first hand, if partial, perspectives on forces at work in 1970. These forces and interests included: a legislature wanting to escape criticism it was hearing in abundance about the dysfunction of the Fisher Act; an aggressive and pragmatic legislator seeking prominence; and—far from least—an almost universal desire to see some significant improvement in the public schools themselves, which activists still perceived as possible if teacher preparation itself could only be significantly strengthened. Probably the most potent factor of all, however, was mix of political forces itself. Ryan, as an astute and ambitious state legislator, along with energetic and sophisticated staff consultants, was able despite considerable opposition to act as a focal point and prime mover, to bring together the forces and interests needed to achieve this major piece of legislation.

The Teacher Preparation and Licensing Act of 1970 created a new governance structure and language for California credentialing. It introduced five new principles:

1. It created an independent licensing agency, the Commission on Teacher Preparation and Licensing, composed primarily of educators to oversee the professional preparation and certification of all educators. This was the first agency of its kind in the country.

2. It endorsed the strong emphasis on subject matter preparation, begun in the Fisher Act, and provided a new avenue by which a candidate might demonstrate subject matter competence: by passing a state-approved subject matter examination or by completing an approved subject matter preparation program, which "waives" the examination requirement. These two avenues also provide, through the exam, the opportunity to add additional teaching fields without additional college course work and permitted "supplemental authorizations" to teach a subject in which a teacher had studied eighteen hours of course work.

3. It created a one credential for all teachers, kindergarten through grade twelve, authorizing teaching assignments by the grade level of the content rather than the age of the students. This one credential also makes possible assignment of teachers in a variety of alternative school organizational patterns.

4. While retaining the “fifth year requirement for a complete license, it provided the option of completing a teacher education program within a four-year college degree. A teacher candidate has seven years to complete the "fifth year.”

5. It created a new language for teaching authorizations: “multiple subjects” for teachers who teach many subjects to a single group of students in a self-contained classroom; and “single subject” for teachers to teach a single content to changing groups of students throughout the school day.

Chapter 5
REFERENCES

1. Sidney A. Inglis, "Informal Notes of the Meeting of the Commission on Teacher Preparation and Licensing, Held on October 4-6, 1974, Sacramento, California," pp. 6-7 [prepared for members of the California Council on the Education of Teachers].

2. Undated press release, obtained by the author from the office of Assembly Member Leo Ryan, October 1974.

3. Assembly Interim Committee Reports: Subcommittee on School Personnel and Teacher Qualifications, *The Restoration of Teaching*, Sacramento, CA, pp. 12-13.

4. *Ibid.*

5. *Ibid.*, p. 14.

6. *Ibid.*, p. 15.

7. *Ibid.*, p. 16.

8. Joint Committee on Teacher Credentialing Practices. *Transcript of Proceedings*, April 7-8, 1968, pp. 1-3.

9. Legislative Analyst, California Legislature, Sacramento, *Teacher Credentialing*, February 1968, p. 33.

10. Joint Committee. *Transcript of Proceedings*, April 7-8, 1968, pp. 3-20.

11. Lane, *Professional Licensure*, p. 133.

12. Joint Committee. *Transcript of Proceedings*, April 7-8, 1968, pp. 21-34.

13. Joint Committee. *Transcript of Proceedings, Part 2*, May 25, 1968, pp. 23-27.

14. James D. Koerner, *The Miseducation of Teachers*. Houghton-Mifflin Co., 1963, p. 82.

15. Lane, *Professional Licensure*, p. 166.

16. *Ibid.,* p. 166-167.

17. *Ibid.,* p. 168.

18. Brodt, *The Cyclical Nature,* p. 196. Also James B. Conant, *The Education of American Teachers,* McGraw-Hill, 1963, p. 24.

19. Koerner, *The Miseducation,* p. 256.

20. Lane, *Professional Licensure*, p. 168-169.

21. *Ibid.,* p. 170-171.

22. *Ibid.,* p. 169.

23. *Ibid.,* p. 170.

24. Conant, *The Education,* p. 15.

25. *Ibid*., p. 203-204.

26. James B. Conant, *Shaping Educational Policy*, McGraw-Hill, 1964, p. 82.

27. Lane, *Professional Licensure*, p. 176.

28. *Ibid.,* p. 177.

29. *Ibid*., p. 180

30. Assembly Bill 740, California Legislature, March 1969.

31. Lane, *Professional Licensure*, p. 207.

32. *Ibid.,* p. 21

33. *Ibid.,* p. 225.

34. *Ibid.,* p. 228.

35. *Ibid.,* p. 231.

36. Sidney A. Inglis, "Oh, Why the Ryan Act?" *California Journal of Teacher Education,* October 1974, pp. 5-6.

37. Governor's Commission on Education Reform, July 28, 1968.

38. Lane, *Professional Licensure*, p. 248.

39. *Ibid.,* p. 267.

40. Letter to the author from U. S. Congressman Leo Ryan, July 7, 1973.

41. Author's telephone interview with Dr. Leroy Lowery, former consultant, Senate Education Committee, December 10, 1971.